Government-Maoist negotiation: Context and process

Govinda Neupane

After the commencement of the second ceasefire between the government and the Maoists, and the initiation of dialogue, some sections of the politicians and intellectuals have created unrealistic optimism. This optimism is neither the result of a critical examination of the process of negotiation nor it has any relation with the substance. Its basis is just the wishful thinking. The process in itself is difficult. This was evident during the previous negotiation exercise. Therefore, it has become important to understand the socio-political and military context, the gaps between expectations of different participating forces and the process by which the entire conflict gets resolved.
The reality of today is that the palace has become the de-facto power. It has formed an alliance with the rightist political forces and a section of intellectuals, who were and are busy in cultivating opportunities. The centrists, primarily composed of Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), have lost popular mass base and also lost control over civil bureaucracy. Now, they are just there as an ideology, non-functional political bureaucracy and as remnants of a historical process. From the perspective of political importance, the left-democratic force, centered around and led by the Maoists is the most dominant force. The traditional Right still enjoys military superiority, whereas the Maoists have become the dominant popular force with a strong military base. The centrist combination has been hanging around a popular political system. From the power-relations perspective, the whole society has been polarized between the Left and the Right. But from the system-relations perspective the centrist are also very much present. Hence, the political superstructure demands a direct negotiation between traditional Right and the Left to resolve the power issues, whereas the centrists also have a role in bridging the ideological and political gap between the opposite poles and also can help a bit in resolving the system-issues.
The traditional Right wants power and will offer some cosmetic role to the leftist and also to the centrists. They will maneuver to disarm the Maoists and will make every effort to strengthen their military capability and expand popular base. The Maoists will try to interfere with the central governance mechanism and will try to create a sound foundation for mass uprising while keeping intact or even strengthening their military power. The centrists, as usual, will try to make their presence felt by increasing their visibility through public relation activities such as meetings, statements, a few demonstrations and so on. In this context, therefore, the negotiation exercise will march through an interesting process.
The first phase has already been in practice. This preliminary stage where feelers from both sides worked overtime, ceasefire was agreed, negotiating teams were formed, code of conduct was finalized, warm up activities were under taken and a battle of wits surfaced. The process during this phase created confusions, hopes, expectations and dreams. Nobody knows how the peaceful resolution would be attained, but everybody has thrown his or her support for a peaceful resolution. Until now, there has been seen more fantasies than realism. The merchants of mediation and sponsors of dialogue also promoted the hype.
The second phase will start in the very day when both the negotiating teams confront each other face to face. From the government side, the traditional right will argue for finding out a solution without addressing the structural issues. It would, as usual, try for sharing power or accommodating the Maoists as junior partner in the ruling coalition. Mostly, the government representatives will try to convince the Maoist team talking more about "bloodshed", "development", "national interest" and "intelligence and immense capacity of Maoist leaders in nation building". Their whole focus will be on cosmetics, or at the best, providing some face saving remedies to the Maoists so as to help them to inter inside the "prestigious Singh Durbar". Therefore, the government will offer solutions without substance. On the other hand, the Maoists will bring forward the more structural issues such as ownership over means of production, equal and mutually beneficial relation with other countries, management of natural resources, system of governance and role of the people etc, and may propose a general debate on the constitutional framework to address such issues. As usual, they will put forward the election of the constituent assembly, and for that purpose a round table conference and formation of an interim government. Some people may argue that the Maoists may settle for reforming the present constitution, but that sounds a remote possibility. Therefore, both sides, after some arguments, threats and maneuvering, may agree on the proposal of the constituent assembly as this could be a better midway activity for the resolution of the conflict.
During this period, the government will also procure more military hardware, provide training to its military force even by bringing external experts, and maneuver for moral and material support from the foreign governments. The efforts will center on improving its military capability. On the other hand, the Maoists will try to consolidate their gains, improve supply lines, strengthen the system of governance in the area they control, reach out to every Nepali villages and townships so as to create a sound ground for mass uprising and also to expand their military strength. Therefore, if the negotiation breaks down, both sides will jump to the battlefield with enhanced military and political might. In this scenario, the process ends then and there. But if the proposal for constitutional reform or the election of the constituent assembly would be accepted, the third phase starts.
During the third phase, if the Maoists will agree for the constitutional reform, it is nearly certain that there would a vertical split within Maoist force. The large majority will go back to the battlefield. A small section of discarded elements will get accommodation within the system and the process ends. But, if the election of the constituent assembly is agreed upon, there will be an interim government represented primarily by the traditional right and the Maoists with a marginal presence of the centrists and a few independents. The formation of the interim government would not be so difficult but agreeing to a mechanism for the control over the police force, government army, Maoist army and civil bureaucracy will be very difficult. If they will manage to develop a mutually agreed mechanism, the implementation phase would start.
In the forth phase, every force will present its core constitutional values in a brief draft for general debate and will try to ensure the victory of its candidate for the assembly. There may be many minor issues but the core contentious issue could be the role of the armed forces of both sides, which could prevent free exercise of the will. If that issue is resolved, there could be an election and there will be a constituent assembly. If the constituent assembly is sovereign and can set a framework to resolving the fundamental issues of social transformation and to designing an appropriate system of governance, the constitution is there. Now, the more difficult phase of amalgamation of different opposing forces starts. If that amalgamation is accomplished, the conflict will get resolved. Therefore, it is too unrealistic and too early to conclude that the resolution of the conflict is very close.
The People's Review weekly, Kathmandu, April 24-30, 2003